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Developing Multilateralism:
The Havana Charter and the Fight for the
International Trade Organization, -
S  W Trade Organization (WTO) was established in, it has been the subject of vocal, and sometimes violent,international protest. Much of the criticism has charged the
WTO regime with placing developing countries at various kinds of
unfair disadvantage. Yet complaints about international economic
organizations’ treatment of poor countries long predated the WTO.
Such issues had affected the negotiations, in the years immediately
after the Second World War, which aimed at establishing an
international trade organization (ITO). Thus, although the attempt to
create the ITO failed, it left a lasting legacy. Not only was the plan a
precursor of the WTO, but the supposedly ‘interim’ general agreement
on tariffs and trade (GATT), negotiated during  in parallel with
discussions on the proposed charter for the ITO, continued as the
basis on which world trade was regulated, until superseded by the
WTO. The GATT rules of , as subsequently amended, were
nested inside the Marrakesh agreement of  as part of that single
agreement. Hence, the spirit of the GATT – and, to some degree, that
of the ITO – lives on in the WTO.
Moreover, the failure to create the ITO – in spite of the successful
negotiation of a charter for the organization at the United Nations
conference on trade and employment held in Havana in - – may
perhaps be seen as a missed opportunity. The ITO might have had a
wider membership than the GATT, which came to be perceived as a
‘rich men’s club’.1 It was not that poor countries were excluded from
membership, but that the organization’s activities were such that they
had little motive for joining: during the s, it concentrated its
efforts on reducing tariffs on industrial goods, an issue of limited
importance to the many underdeveloped countries which had yet to
industrialize.2 The ITO might have been a more attractive organization
for underdeveloped countries to join, which might, in turn, have
1 See, e.g., Revisiting US Trade Policy: Decisions in Perspective, ed. A. E. Eckes, Jr. (Athens, OH,
), p. .
2 J. Toye and R. Toye, The Intellectual History of the United Nations: II: The North-South Encounter:
Finance, Trade, and Development (Bloomington, ), introd.
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promoted less autarchic/anarchic trade policies among them with
additional growth benefits. This development might, in its turn, have
given a further boost to the impressive post-Second World War growth
in world trade that took place under the auspices of GATT. At the
same time, the Havana charter’s exceptions to free-trade rules, espe-
cially those made in the interests of the economic development of
poorer countries, might have helped to reduce global inequalities. The
possibility that the ITO might have produced a more inclusive, pro-
ductive, orderly, and just world economy than that which in fact
emerged lends strong interest to the reasons for its stillbirth.
The first scholar to consider why the ITO became defunct was
William Diebold, a member of the United States Council on Foreign
Relations, and a former member of the state department’s commercial
policy division. In an essay published in October , he sought to
explain why the Truman administration, in December , had
quietly dropped its attempt to push the charter through congress, thus
ensuring that the ITO would not come into being. Diebold argues that
the administration was distracted by the cold war and not politically
strong enough to steer the charter through congress. In addition, the
charter itself elicited opposition not only from protectionists, but also
from free-trade ‘perfectionists’ who felt that it marked too great a
departure from liberal trade principles. This argument has been re-
flected in the work of subsequent scholars, and is not open to serious
question. It does, however, raise the issue of why US negotiators
agreed to these departures from free-trade principles, a question which
must, accepting that Diebold’s argument is right, form a key part of
the explanation for why the attempt to create an ITO failed.
Until recently, there have been no comprehensive accounts of the
conference at Havana that finalized the ITO charter (leaving aside
contemporary American works aimed at persuading public, scholarly,
and, in particular, congressional opinion of the charter’s merits).1
Diebold was attempting ‘an essay in interpretation, not an historical
narrative’, and therefore did not give ‘a documented, play-by-play
account’ of the events surrounding the negotiation of the charter.2
Richard N. Gardner’s classic work, first published in , gave an
excellent account of events both before and after the conference, but
paid little attention to the conference itself.3 However, in , Steve
Dryden, in his history of the office of the US trade representative,
provided a straightforward factual narrative of the events at Havana,
1 C. Wilcox, A Charter for World Trade (New York, ), pp. -; W. A. Brown, The United States
and the Restoration of World Trade: An Analysis and Appraisal of the ITO Charter and the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Washington DC, ), pp. -. For the text of the charter itself,
see British Government White Paper, Cmd. , ‘United Nations Conference on Trade and
Employment’, April  (henceforward ‘Havana Charter’).
2 W. Diebold, The End of the ITO (Princeton, ), p. .
3 R. N. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy in Current Perspective: The Origins and Prospects of Our
International Order (New York, ).
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largely from the point of view of the US participants.1 Similarly,
Thomas W. Zeiler concludes that the agreement reached on the
charter ‘was largely a product of the Cold War. That is, the United
States conceded ground because of a concern that the Soviets would
make political capital out of a breakdown in Cuba.’2
It would be idle to deny that the imperatives of the cold war created
an additional incentive for US policy-makers, who had already spent
years working on the ITO charter, to complete it. As a substantial part
of the world became shut off behind the iron curtain, the ITO, origin-
ally conceived of as a global institution, took on a new political pur-
pose for the United States. Freer trade became a means of strength-
ening the free world economically as part of the defence against
Communism, rather than, as previously, a means of eroding warlike
tensions among all countries. However, to attribute the concessions
made by the United States at Havana to the cold war is to beg the
question of why it made those concessions in particular. As fifty-six
countries attended the conference, the United States could not please
everybody equally. It chose, in fact, to make concessions to the under-
developed countries. At the same time, it refused key concessions to
European countries, especially Britain, which were vital cold war allies
essential to the defence of Western Europe. Clearly, the ‘cold war’
explanation for the outcome at Havana is in need of clarification and
refinement.
Without ignoring the cold war context, this article argues that the
outcome of the conference was substantially a product of the US
decision to extend its concept of multilateralism so as to allow a wide
range of countries to help to design the new organization, rather than
hoping that they would accede, passively, to a US blueprint. As decol-
onization added to the numbers of independent countries available to
take part in the negotiations, and as – partly in consequence – the con-
cept of economic underdevelopment gained a new importance in inter-
national affairs, there was increased pressure for the ITO to be
designed with the needs of poor countries in mind. This was apparent
even before the outbreak in earnest of the cold war in early .
Furthermore, granting special treatment to underdeveloped countries
inevitably involved sacrificing some of the interests of developed coun-
tries. The United States’s willingness to do this enraged, in particular,
the British, who became increasingly isolated in the face of the US-led
coalition. Nevertheless, in spite of their reservations, the British signed
the conference’s final act – as US negotiators calculated they would –
because they were unwilling to be seen to jeopardize the project.
1 S. Dryden, Trade Warriors: USTR and the American Crusade for Free Trade (Oxford, ), pp. -.
See also, S. A. Aaronson, Trade and the American Dream: A Social History of Postwar Trade Policy
(Lexington, KY, ), pp. -,  and The WTO as an International Organization, ed. A. O. Krueger
(Chicago, ), pp. -.
2 T. W. Zeiler, Free Trade, Free World: The Advent of GATT (Chapel Hill, ), p. .
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Hence the United States successfully exploited the multilateral format
of the talks, to extend its range of alliances at the expense of Great
Britain. Moreover, rather than pushing the United States towards
agreement, the cold war distracted its attention from the efforts being
made in Havana. The United States’s comparative indifference to the
ITO – not shared by the US officials present at the conference – helps
to explain why the charter was ultimately dropped.
In making this argument, the article will try to correct the tendency
in the literature to approach the negotiations from the US point of
view. It aims to give due weight to the demands of the underdeveloped
countries – which Zeiler dismisses as ‘dramatics’ – and to the British.1
Britain was still the world’s second most powerful trading state, and
the Anglo-American relationship – and the mutual suspicion in which
it became mired – proved crucial to the outcome of the talks.
* * *
In July , Democratic congressman Cordell Hull argued in the
house of representatives that the president should call an international
trade conference, to be held in Washington at the close of the war, for
the purposes of establishing ‘a permanent international trade congress’.
(Later, in , he used the term ‘International Trade Organization’.)
The proposed congress, he said, should consider ‘all international
trade methods, practices, and policies which in their effects are calcu-
lated to create destructive commercial controversies or bitter economic
wars, and to formulate agreements with respect thereto, designed to
eliminate and avoid the injurious results and dangerous possibilities of
economic warfare, and to promote fair and friendly trade relations
among all the nations of the world.’2
Prior to the Second World War, however, this idea was not practical
politics. When Hull became Franklin D. Roosevelt’s secretary of state
in , he pursued freer trade bilaterally rather than multilaterally –
the world economic conference of  was a notable failure – under
the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) of . When US
planning for the post-war world started within the state department in
, it was predicated at first on the assumption that progress towards
freer trade would be based on the extension of the existing programme.
The wartime discussions nonetheless led to a seminal shift in US trade
policy, towards a multilateral approach.3 The shift affected joint Anglo-
1 Zeiler, Free Trade, p. . For a more detailed examination of the attitude of the underdeveloped
countries, see Toye and Toye, Intellectual History, ch. .
2 C. Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull: I (London, ), pp. -. For Hull’s  remark, see US
S[enate] C[ommittee on] F[inance,] H[earings on] I[nternational] T[rade] O[rganization] () S-
O-A, p. .
3 See J. Miller, ‘The Pursuit of a Talking Shop: Political Origins of American Multilateralism, -
’, paper presented to the th meeting of the Eastern Economics Association, March ; and
also Global America, ed. F. Ninkovich (Chicago, ).
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American planning from . In July , James Meade (a British
economist and wartime official) suggested a plan for an international
commercial union, designed to create a multilateral trading system,1
which underpinned the Anglo-American talks on future international
economic collaboration held in Washington in the autumn of . As
Jamie Miller notes, by the time the talks began, the British and Ameri-
cans had, for differing reasons, reached the same conclusion: the world
needed a trading system that involved multilateral clearing, a multi-
lateral negotiating mechanism for reducing tariffs, and – crucially for
the argument here – multilateral influence over the design and oper-
ation of the system’s rules and exceptions.2 They assumed that the
creation of an international trade organization, to promote freer trade
on a multilateral, non-discriminatory basis and to regulate the use of
devices such as trade preferences and state trading, would help them to
reach their goal.
Joint Anglo-American proposals on commercial policy were agreed
in December  at the time of the post-war US loan to Britain. They
committed Britain to enter into negotiations for the substantial reduc-
tion of tariffs and the elimination of tariff preferences, as its con-
tribution to a ‘mutually advantageous’ reduction in world trade bar-
riers.3 The proposals were subsequently elaborated in a draft ITO
charter put forward by the United States, and discussed at the first
session of the preparatory committee to the UN conference on trade
and employment which met between  October and  November
, and which eighteen countries attended.
One of the most important issues that emerged was ‘full employ-
ment’, which was really a way of expressing concern about the stability
of international demand.4 Memories of the inter-war depression trig-
gered the fear that, in a liberalized world economy, damaging trends in
the United States would rapidly cause disruption elsewhere. In particu-
lar, it was widely believed that the ability of underdeveloped countries
to maintain markets for their primary products hinged on US willing-
ness to keep up its demand for them.5 But however apparently vital, no
delegation proposed international measures to expand or maintain
employment. The proponents of full employment were satisfied by,
first, recognition of the fact that a persistent US export surplus or a
sudden, sharp decline in the US demand for imports would put other
1 The Collected Papers of James Meade: III: International Economics, ed. S. Howson (London, ), pp.
-.
2 J. Miller, ‘Wartime Origins of Multilateralism’ (Ph.D. dissertation, Cambridge, ).
3 Cmd. , ‘Proposals for Consideration by an International Conference on Trade and Employ-
ment’,  Dec. .
4 Report of the Canadian Delegation to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment
at Havana,  July , D[ocuments on] C[anadian] E[xternal] R[elations], , xiv. ; see also
Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy, pp. -.
5 See John M. Leddy, Oral History,  June  [Independence, MO, Truman Presidential Library],
pp. -.
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countries in balance-of-payments difficulties; and second, a provision
giving countries in such difficulties greater freedom than initially en-
visaged to use quantitative import restrictions to protect their monetary
reserves.1
A second important issue was the industrialization of undeveloped
areas. Australia, with the support of India, China, Lebanon, Brazil,
and Chile, urged that undeveloped states should be allowed to use im-
port quotas to help to promote industrialization.2 This apparently diffi-
cult issue was resolved, however, when the US delegation introduced
into the draft charter a new chapter on economic development (chap-
ter IV, articles -). Under this chapter, members of the ITO would
‘recognize that special governmental assistance may be required in
order to promote the establishment or reconstruction of particular
industries and that such assistance may take the form of protective
measures’. The ITO itself would be responsible for judging applica-
tions from countries to be allowed to take such measures.3 The United
States, then, had made significant concessions towards the point of
view of underdeveloped countries even prior to the declaration of the
Truman doctrine in March , which marked the real start of the
cold war. Multilateral influence over the design of the ITO’s rules
made this inevitable.
Notwithstanding Zeiler’s claim that ‘the London charter corrupted
free trade ideals,’ the US plans for the ITO remained on course.4 The
second meeting of the preparatory committee was held in April  in
Geneva. The revisions to the draft charter were complete by August,
although the simultaneous negotiations aimed at achieving mutual
tariff concessions dragged on until October. India now took over from
Australia the unofficial leadership of the underdeveloped countries,
which continued their efforts to secure more latitude for themselves in
using measures that the developed countries believed to be inconsis-
tent with the basic principles of multilateral trade. These efforts con-
centrated on freedom to use protective devices such as quantitative
restrictions, differential internal taxation, mixing regulations, and pref-
erences between neighbouring states, for the purposes of economic
development.5 Another issue was the treatment of private foreign cap-
ital invested in underdeveloped countries; there was a general un-
willingness to give guarantees as to its security, and, in some cases, a
feeling that such capital in itself was suspect, and a likely tool of
foreign exploitation.
The latter issue subsequently played an important part in alienating
1 F[oreign] R[elations of the] U[nited] S[tates], , i. ; U[nited] N[ations], Report of the First
Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment (Lon-
don, ), p. . See also Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy, pp. -.
2 Wilcox to Byrnes,  Dec. , FRUS, , i. .
3 UN, Report of the First Session, pp. -; see also, Brown, Restoration, pp. -.
4 Zeiler, Free Trade, p. .
5 Report of the Canadian Delegation,  July , DCER, , xiv. .
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US business opinion from the ITO: the Havana charter’s rule that
foreign investments could not be expropriated or nationalized except
under ‘just’, ‘reasonable’, or ‘appropriate’ conditions could be inter-
preted as weakening the protection that US investments abroad had
previously enjoyed.1 Moreover, the United States was forced to make
some significant, though not fatal, concessions over non-discrimin-
ation, new regional preferences, and the use of quantitative restrictions
in the interests of economic development.2 Greater latitude for new
regional preferences was in line with the new US agenda for European
economic integration under the Marshall Plan. The British had
favoured the freedom to discriminate and to employ quantitative re-
strictions in the interests of solving balance-of-payments problems; but
they had worked with the Americans in trying to resist pressure from
the less developed countries. Alarmingly for the US negotiators, how-
ever, on  August, during the round of speeches that marked the
completion of the draft charter, Harold Wilson, a junior British trade
minister, offered a stark warning: in the coming months and years, he
said, Britain would have to use methods that ‘may appear to be
opposed to the principles and methods of the draft charter’.3
Wilson’s announcement was the result of Britain’s dire economic
situation, which, days earlier, had led to the suspension of the short-
lived experiment of sterling convertibility. Britain’s undoubted com-
mitment to the ITO project was being progressively undermined by its
increasing doubts that it could sustain economically the full obligations
incumbent upon membership were it to adopt them in the near future.
At the same time, British ministers were increasingly sceptical of the
United States’s willingness to provide the precondition for the ITO’s
success by substantially reducing its own trade barriers. Accordingly,
the Labour government of Clement Attlee followed a twofold strategy.
On the one hand, while accepting ITO principles, it asked for the most
burdensome obligations to be postponed; on the other, it doggedly
resisted US demands for the substantial elimination of the imperial
preference system, insisting that the proposed reductions in US tariffs,
offered as a quid pro quo, were insufficient.
In the short term, this strategy was remarkably successful. In late
July , the British had reached the conclusion that were they to
accept the non-discrimination provisions of the GATT – the prelim-
inary agreement that was to govern world trade prior to the ITO
charter coming into force – that coming November as was planned,
they were unlikely to be able to live up to them. They succeeded in
1 The WTO, ed. Krueger, p. .
2 Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy, pp. -; UN, Report of the Second Session of the Preparatory
Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment (London, ). See also, Toye
and Toye, Intellectual History, ch. .
3 Speech by Wilson, preparatory committee of the UN conference on trade and employment, th
meeting,  Aug.  [Geneva], W[orld] T[rade] O[rganization Archives]; Gardner, Sterling-Dollar
Diplomacy, p. .
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persuading the Americans to agree to a breathing space before the pro-
visions came into force – it lasted until the end of  – thus helping
Britain, and other countries, to conserve dollars. (France, independ-
ently, and apparently in ignorance of the British request, made a
similar approach to the United States.) And in September, they faced
down US threats that Marshall aid would be withheld from Britain
unless a major move was made towards the abolition of imperial
preference.1 These successes had the effect of emboldening the British,
during the talks at Havana, to demand further concessions. The tactic
infuriated the Truman administration, and the resulting breakdown in
mutual trust had significant repercussions for the final form, and thus
the eventual fate, of the ITO charter.
* * *
The conference, which was held in the Cuban parliament building, the
Capitolio, in the centre of Havana, opened on  November. In spite
of the low opinion that the Truman administration had developed of
key British ministers in consequence of the stand-off at Geneva, both
sides presumed that they would work together. This proved difficult.
In the absence of ministerial representation, the acting leader of the
British delegation was a civil servant, the second secretary to the board
of trade, Stephen Holmes. His influence was undermined by both poor
communication with, and political interference from, ministers in
London. Of these, the chancellor of the exchequer, Sir Stafford
Cripps, held sway over the more cautious Wilson, now president of the
board of trade. As will be seen, Cripps’s long-range interventions were
maladroit, and the Havana delegation’s resultant changes of tack
risked provoking ridicule. As the leader of the Australian delegation,
Herbert Coombs, commented towards the end of the conference,
countries, such as his own, which tried to support Britain, were put in
an awkward situation: ‘It was embarrassing to have to change one’s
position as the United Kingdom’s changed.’2
The US delegation proved to be better managed. Its chairman was
the ‘tall, strikingly handsome, beautifully attired, articulate, affable,
assured’ Will Clayton, formerly under-secretary of state for economic
affairs,3 who had retired from the state department only the previous
month. The British, who doubted the effect of his visits to the con-
ference – he was not present continuously – underrated his effective-
1 For a full discussion, see R. Toye, ‘The Attlee Government, the Imperial Preference System, and
the Creation of the GATT’, English Historical Review, cxviii (). For the French, see Wilcox to
Clayton,  Feb. , FRUS, , i. .
2 UK D[elegation in] H[avana] to F[oreign] O[ffice],  March  [London, Public Record
Office], F[oreign] O[ffice Records] /.
3 J. K. Galbraith, A Life in Our Times: Memoirs (London, ), p. . For an account of Clayton’s
life, see G. A. Fossedal, Our Finest Hour: Will Clayton, the Marshall Plan, and the Triumph of
Democracy (Stanford, ).
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ness behind the scenes.1 Of similar importance was Clayton’s deputy,
Clair Wilcox, a former professor at Swarthmore College. He could be
abrasive when crossed, and was prone to lecture other delegations on
their failings.2 Nonetheless, he played a key role in the completion of
the charter, bringing himself close to breakdown during the confer-
ence’s final frenetic weeks.
Clayton, Wilcox, and other state department officials who shared
their mindset are characterized by Zeiler as ‘visionary free-traders’,
albeit ones who, when it came to the point, swapped their principles
for expediency in order to obtain agreement to the draft charter.3
Certainly, British observers frequently derived the impression that they
were wild-eyed idealists, who failed to see the world as it really was.4
Moreover, many US supporters of protectionism also shared this view,
albeit from a different perspective. However, Clayton and Wilcox
themselves stressed that they did not believe in complete free trade,
which, they stated, would be impracticable; rather, they believed in
freer trade.5 They made this point, of course, partly in deference to the
strengthening of protectionist sentiment at home. The Republicans
had won control of congress in , making it harder for the Truman
administration to win approval for measures of trade liberalization.
Clayton and Wilcox were therefore eager, in order to shore up domes-
tic support for their wider programme, to obtain an exemption for
export subsidies on primary commodities from the principles of the
charter.6 In this respect, the US representatives proved just as willing
as those of other countries to modify free-trade principles to suit their
own purposes.
Therefore, the real issue at Havana was not whether the principles
would be modified, but in what ways, and to what extent. And because
the majority of the fifty-six countries present were, or at least classed
themselves as, economically underdeveloped, the question of develop-
ment became central to discussion.7 As Wilcox subsequently recorded,
‘the most violent controversies at the conference and the most pro-
tracted ones were those evoked by issues raised in the name of eco-
nomic development.’ He also noted that the leadership of the under-
developed countries had shifted to the Latin American states (eighteen
of which were present); and believed that the views they expressed
1 Holmes to Woods,  Jan. , FO /.
2 For a brief character sketch, see Dryden, Trade Warriors, p. .
3 Zeiler, Free Trade, esp. pp. , .
4 See, e.g., Lancashire and Whitehall: The Diary of Raymond Streat: II: -, ed. M. Dupree (Man-
chester, ), p. .
5 See US SCFHITO () S-O-A, p. ; UK D[elegation in] G[eneva] to FO,  April , FO
/; and ‘Summary of Statement by the Honourable William L. Clayton before the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, January , ’ [College Park, MD, United States National
Archives], R[ecord] G[roup] , I[nternational] T[rade] F[iles], box .
6 Brown, Restoration, pp. -.
7 Zeiler, Free Trade, p. .
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were ‘extreme’.1 Indeed, the Argentine delegation, under the leader-
ship of the fervent Perónist Diego Luis Molinari, does seem to have
been out to wreck the conference. Cuba and Brazil, by contrast, gave
general support to the Geneva draft of the charter.2 Latin American
delegations supported one another, out of solidarity, even when the
issue at stake was of no importance to the country giving support.3 The
Canadian delegate, Dana Wilgress, claimed privately that the Latin
American countries were disturbed about the implications of the Mar-
shall Plan: ‘They felt the fairy godmother of the North was deserting
them in favour of Europe.’4
Yet, the scathing attitude of the developed countries towards the
claims of the underdeveloped was by no means wholly justified. The
war and post-war period had been one of profound economic disloca-
tion, even for countries that did not suffer direct war damage. In Latin
America, for example, many of the industries created in wartime stood
little chance of surviving in peacetime without heavy protection.5 Such
developments alarmed the developing countries, which argued that the
charter in its existing form was devised for the benefit of the developed
countries (which would benefit from let-outs when in economic diffi-
culties), but did not allow the underdeveloped ones the let-outs they
needed to develop their own economies.6 The division of opinion at
the conference was summed up effectively by the delegate of El Salva-
dor, Ricardo Jiménez Castillo: ‘The industrialized countries’ concept
of equilibrium was very formal, while the underdeveloped countries
felt that there should be a basic criterion – unequal treatment for un-
equally developed countries.’7 Even if the demands of some of the
undeveloped countries were extreme and not always lucidly explained,
and their behaviour erratic, their demand for ‘unequal treatment’ de-
served sympathetic consideration.
The United States stood firm, however. As a consequence, by the
end of the first month the conference had made little progress. The
major stumbling block was the question of quantitative import restric-
tions (QRs). Their use was governed by article  of the draft charter,
added in Geneva, which provided an escape from the general embargo
on them for the purposes of protection, but required that its use be
approved by the ITO in advance. The underdeveloped bloc rejected
the rule of ‘prior approval’, as they wanted more-or-less unrestricted
1 Wilcox, Charter, pp. , .
2 S. R. Niblo, War, Diplomacy, and Development: The United States and Mexico, - (Wilmington,
DE, ), p. ; Dryden, Trade Warriors, p. ; draft tel. prepared by the US D[elegation at]
H[avana],  Jan. , FRUS, , i. -; Wilcox to Brown,  Nov. , RG  ITF, box .
3 Draft tel., USDH,  Jan. , FRUS, , i. -.
4 Report of the Canadian delegation,  July , DCER, , xiv. .
5 UN, Economic Survey of Latin America  (New York, ), pp. -. For a discussion, see Toye
and Toye, Intellectual History, ch. .
6 Crowe, ‘ITO’,  Dec. , FO /.
7 Heads of delegations: summary record of meeting, Records of Havana Conference,  Dec. ,
WTO, E/Conf./.
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freedom to use QRs for the purposes of economic development. On 
December, deadlock having been reached, Wilcox told the conference
that, unless the other countries accepted an agreement on the lines the
United States suggested, it might employ QRs itself in the future, thus
injuring other countries.1 The threat, as the Latin Americans saw it,
did not have the desired effect.2 By the end of the month, the US
delegation were despairing of being able to draft a charter that would
find widespread acceptance.
The issue of QRs also impinged on Anglo-American relations, with
significant consequences for the future of the conference. On the tech-
nical question itself, the British felt that the US position was rigid and
unrealistic, but also feared that weak provisions on QRs would severely
damage British exports.3 The matter was further complicated by Brit-
ain’s objectives on non-discrimination. On  December, a cabinet
committee (with Attlee in the chair) considered the instructions to be
given to the British delegation. Should it try to secure the continued
suspension of the non-discrimination obligations agreed at Geneva?
And, if so, for how long? One choice was to press for all such obliga-
tions to be deferred until March , when the post-war transition
period, as designated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
would end. Of the ministers present, only Wilson was cautious, lest
Britain should imperil its prospects of receiving Marshall aid free of
non-discrimination obligations on the lines of those imposed by the
loan agreement in . He thought it prudent merely to press for an
extension of the breathing space until the end of . His senior
colleagues, including Cripps and the foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin,
overrode him.4
The demand for this concession was likely to try US patience, not
least because it would encourage the underdeveloped countries to
demand a quid pro quo, making it more difficult for the developed
countries to hold the line on the QRs/economic development issue. As
one foreign office official, C. T. Crowe, noted at the end of the month,
‘while the Americans are beginning to recognise that we have a good
case’ for a waiver until , ‘the arguments for it unfortunately pro-
vide the “developers” with a first class weapon in their attack on us.’5
And as Wilson pointed out to his colleagues at the end of the month
(when the conference seemed on the verge of breakdown), the insist-
ence on the extended waiver would put the British in a difficult pos-
ition. If they pressed for the waiver, he suggested, the underdeveloped
countries would stiffen their attitude to QRs and the United States
1 Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy, pp. -. See also, Dryden, Trade Warriors, pp. -.
2 Briggs to Marshall,  Jan. , FRUS, , i. .
3 Minutes, E[conomic] P[olicy] C[ommittee],  Dec.  [London, Public Record Office]
CAB[inet records] / () th; Wilson, memo, ‘International Trade Conference: Prior Ap-
proval for Quantitative Restrictions’,  Dec. , CAB EPC () .
4 Minutes, EPC,  Dec. , CAB / () th.
5 Crowe, ‘ITO’,  Dec. , FO /.
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would blame Britain for the failure of the conference. Although break-
down was in fact averted, Britain’s insistence on the waiver did, as
Wilson appeared to foresee, contribute to its isolation at Havana.1
* * *
At the close of the year, while British ministers canvassed amongst
themselves the possibility of trying to secure a prolonged adjournment
to the conference, the Truman administration considered its own
options. Whereas general acceptance of the Geneva draft of the charter
seemed unobtainable, the United States would not accept any text
with provisions of the kind likely to be acceptable to the other coun-
tries represented at Havana. Three possibilities were considered: first,
‘to press for a really acceptable Charter’ with the adherence of thirty or
more countries representing over  per cent of world trade; second, to
obtain general agreement at Havana on the main points of the charter,
and then adjourn the conference to New York or Geneva in June to
discuss the remaining issues; and third, to settle at Havana the terms
for a purely consultative or ‘skeleton’ ITO. At a series of meetings in
Washington in early January , Clayton agreed with state depart-
ment officials that they should choose the first option, ‘staying at
Havana as long as necessary’ to get a strong and acceptable charter.
Wilcox, who was still in Cuba, thought the decision unwise.2 What
accounted for it?
Zeiler argues that the Truman administration feared that if the talks
broke down, the international alliance against Communism would be
subverted.3 There is some evidence to support this contention. For ex-
ample, in a memorandum of  December which Zeiler quotes, the
economic adviser in the state department’s office of international trade
policy, Joseph Coppock, argued: ‘The Russians would be in a position
to make heavy propaganda use of the Havana failure and would be in a
better position to bring other countries under their economic or polit-
ical influence.’ Nevertheless, it would be wrong to push the argument
too far. Clayton, whose influence was crucial, was not, at this stage, a
notably enthusiastic cold warrior. As late as August , mere weeks
before the Soviet Union announced that it would not take part in the
conference, he had appeared ‘to have some idealistic hope that Russia
would join [the] ITO and drop her autarchic and bilateral bartering
trade practices’.4 Moreover, he, and the state department, had other
1 Wilson, memo, ‘International Trade Conference: Prior Approval for Quantitative Restrictions’, 
Dec. , CAB EPC () ; minutes, EPC,   Dec. , CAB / EPC () th.
2 Memo by Brown,  Jan. , FRUS, , i. -; memos, Wilcox to Clayton,  Dec. ,
and Brown to Clayton,  Dec.  (marked ‘not sent’), USNA, RG , ITF, box ; Dryden,
Trade Warriors, p. .
3 Zeiler, Free Trade, p. .
4 Wilson, ‘Note on discussion with Mr Clayton, Geneva, th August, ’,  Aug.  [London,
Public Record Office], T[reasury Records] /.
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things on their minds than the cold war. Coppock, for one, feared that
the United Nations would suffer loss of prestige in the social and
economic field if the conference failed. Moreover, given that the ITO
project was ‘the core of the post-war economic programme which
developed from the Atlantic Charter and the Lend-Lease agreements’,
it seems unlikely that the US officials most closely associated with it
would have easily abandoned it, even had there been no cold war.1 The
project had an institutional momentum behind it; its proponents may
have employed cold war rhetoric less from conviction than as their best
hope of obtaining a hearing in Washington. They were trying to show
the ITO’s continuing political relevance, at a time when it was increas-
ingly in doubt.
Not all parts of the Truman administration were equally interested
in the ITO. The US delegates in Havana had problems getting their
masters back home to give it the necessary attention. In a private dis-
cussion with the British in early January, ‘Clayton admitted very
frankly that he had found considerable difficulty in getting United
States authorities at Washington to take any connected interest in the
Charter, their attention being almost entirely directed to Marshall Aid.
This was one of the reasons why he was, he said, most apprehensive
lest [the] Charter would be crowded out unless completed very
shortly.’2 Therefore, if the cold war added urgency to the US delega-
tion’s efforts to complete the charter, this was at least in part because
cold war issues were making the ITO less urgent to those higher up the
political ladder. The Truman administration had not decided, as a
consequence of the new global political situation, to put its all into
reaching agreement at Havana, even at the cost of accepting significant
compromise.
Although the US delegation pressed ahead in the face of Washing-
ton’s neglect, it soon lost its sense of urgency, as it became clear that
congress was unlikely to consider the charter during , even were it
to be completed in short order. At the same time, the British and US
delegations had some difficulty agreeing and sticking to a ‘party line’ in
their dealings with the underdeveloped countries. At a meeting of the
‘inner group’ of countries that had attended the preparatory committee
in Geneva, called to see how far it would be possible to meet the
claims of the underdeveloped group without impairing the charter,
Wilcox sidetracked the talks by launching into a diatribe against the
alleged attempt by European countries to ‘whittle down all [the] non-
discrimination obligations which they had accepted at Geneva and
which he said had been largely drawn up by them for their own
convenience’.3 The conference remained stuck in the doldrums for the
1 Coppock to Brown,  Dec. , FRUS, , i. .
2 UKDH to FO,  Jan. , FO /.
3 UKDH to FO,  Jan. , FO /; minute on proceedings at Havana,  Jan. , FO
/. See also minutes, mtg., USDH,  Feb. , USNA, RG , ITF, box .
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greater part of January, in spite of machiavellian US attempts, under-
taken self-confessedly ‘with some deliberate malice’, to drive those
countries which had taken part in the preparatory committee towards
quick solutions.1
Then things speeded up. Wilcox noted at the end of the conference
that ‘December and January were a Sunday-School picnic compared to
February and March.’2 The successful, if frenzied, completion of the
charter during this period was contingent on a key change in US
strategy, which came about as follows. A meeting of the US delegation
on  February decided on a showdown with the Latin American coun-
tries, probably on the issue of QRs, even at the risk of precipitating an
open break with them. But later that day, the political adviser to the
delegation, Albert F. Nufer, wrote a memorandum counselling ‘that
any such action be postponed until we have explored every possibility
of reaching some agreement with the Latinos on QRs without receding
from our position with regard to prior approval’. This might be done,
he thought, by streamlining the ITO’s procedures for approving QRs,
for example by setting down a time limit for decisions. Moreover, the
right which countries had under article  of the draft charter, to use,
under certain conditions, QRs on agricultural and fisheries products
without prior approval, might be extended to industrial products. This,
he argued, would meet the objections of the Latin Americans, who had
consistently argued that, as they were primarily exporters of agricul-
tural products and importers of industrial products, they would be
damaged by article  in its existing form. Nufer wrote:
In the event we force a showdown, it seems at best doubtful that our views on
QR will prevail and that we will not be voted down … An open break with the
Latinos … would have far-reaching political consequences in the Western
Hemisphere. Also, it would inevitably be exploited by the Soviet Union and by
the Communist groups and opposition parties in the several Latin American
countries, as well as in other parts of the world.3
Although not all of Nufer’s suggestions were taken up – his sugges-
tion on article  was left in abeyance – the drift of his advice pre-
vailed. On  February, the US delegation agreed to leave ‘the really
nasty showdown’ with the underdeveloped countries until a common
line had been established with the countries that had been members of
the preparatory committee.4 Establishing a common line with this
group involved agreeing to a set of concessions that could be offered to
the developing nations to take or leave; a decision that proved crucial
to the success of the conference.
1 Minutes, mtg., USDH,  Jan. , USNA, RG , ITF, box .
2 Wilcox to Stinebower,  March , USNA, RG , ITF, box .
3 Minutes, mtg., USDH,  Feb. , USNA, RG , ITF, box ; memo by Nufer,  Feb. ,
FRUS, , i. -.
4 Minutes, mtg., USDH,  Feb. , USNA, RG , ITF, box .
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Here was the point at which cold war concerns did prove highly
important in determining the actions of the US representatives at
Havana. The fear of a Communist propaganda victory added to the
desire to avoid a defeat and a breach with other countries from the
western hemisphere, and led the US delegation to adopt a less directly
confrontational position towards the developing countries. But it was
not the case, as Zeiler states, that the cold war drove the United States
to make sweeping concessions to all-comers, ‘rich and poor alike’, in
order to prevent their economies being weakened, and thus to guard
against Communism.1 This was not only because the US negotiators
saw the kinds of freedoms to restrict trade that others were demanding
as sources of weakness rather than strength, and thus unlikely to
reinforce the front against Soviet expansion, but also because they
could not satisfy in full the competing demands of the developed and
the underdeveloped countries. In choosing to look for a compromise
with the latter, the interests of the former had to some degree to be
sacrificed. This brought the United States onto a collision course with
Britain.
* * *
The compromise on article , as finally embodied in the charter,
meant that the ITO would be expected to give automatic approval to
QRs on commodities not covered by existing trade agreements if any
of a number of conditions were met. One, which required that the
industry had been started between  and , was intended to
cover the case of uneconomic industries started during the war or
immediate post-war periods.2 The British delegation, who at first
vigorously opposed the US attempt to reach this compromise with the
Latin American and other underdeveloped countries, found themselves
‘almost alone in seeking to restrain the Americans from progressive
weakening of the text of Article ’. They received only moderate
support from Canada and France. ‘In our view the United States have
been astonishingly feeble in their approach to this whole problem, and
we have been led to the conclusion that their attitude was dictated
primarily by a wish to gain credit with the Latin American countries.’3
In London, Cripps and Wilson complained to the US ambassador,
Lewis W. Douglas:
The President of the Board of Trade explained that we had given way on so
many things which did not directly affect ourselves but which were of
advantage, e.g., to India and to Latin American countries in allowing them to
build up their industries under protection, that the result would be to limit the
volume of world trade instead of restricting protective practices. We ourselves,
however, were to be the only exception and we doubted whether the scheme
1 Zeiler, Free Trade, p. .
2 Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy, p. .
3 UKDH to FO,  Feb.  FO /; see also, UKDH to FO,  Feb. , FO /.
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which now appeared to be emerging at Havana would be in any way
acceptable to us … We had got certain advantages at Geneva in return for the
concessions we had made, but we were now asked to make further concessions
and at the same time to agree to all our own protection being removed.1
In other words, Britain was being asked to agree to concessions to
underdeveloped countries on QRs (under article ), while receiving,
in its own view, insufficient rights to discriminate (under article ).
But the complaint was to no avail. As Wilcox reported, gleefully, to his
colleagues, ‘the UK is trying to pressure us at the last minute but they
cannot get away with it since the US has fifty countries lined up to
support the Charter, including the rest of the British Commonwealth
and Europe. The UK is absolutely isolated and their position is as
impossible as that of a small boy standing in front of a steam roller.’2
The United States had also made another concession – to which the
British also objected – in order to help swing other countries behind
the charter in the form in which it was emerging. This was the pro-
vision, under article , that the ITO would be expected to give auto-
matic approval to new regional preference agreements, created for the
purposes of economic development, if they conformed to certain
agreed standards concerning size, duration, and notice to and negoti-
ation with other countries affected.3 The concession was designed to
obtain the adherence of the Arab and Central American countries to
the charter, and, as the intra-regional trade of these groups of countries
was of no great economic significance, most industrialized countries
were willing to acquiesce.4 The British felt that the arrangement dis-
criminated against the United Kingdom, the Commonwealth, and the
Crown colonies on the grounds that these countries were not geo-
graphically contiguous. The Commonwealth and Empire should have
the same rights to establish new preferences as were contemplated for
countries in the same region as one another. As the ITO’s approval
would not have been needed for the maintenance of the existing
imperial preference system, and as it was unlikely that a new Common-
wealth preference system would be established, it would appear that
the British made the argument as a sop to imperialist sentiment at
home rather than for economic reasons. This sensitivity to domestic
political factors may explain why the issue became of key importance
in the minds of many British ministers.
On  February, Cripps and Wilson, at a second meeting with
Douglas, handed him an aide-mémoire, outlining their difficulties on
regional blocs, QRs, and non-discrimination.5 Cripps and Douglas
were able to agree that non-discrimination could probably be dealt
1 Bevin to Inverchapel,  Feb. , FO /.
2 Minutes, mtg., USDH,  Feb. , USNA, RG , ITF, box .
3 Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy, pp. -.
4 Wilcox to Clayton,  Feb. , FRUS, , i. -.
5 For the text of the aide-mémoire, see UKDH to FO,  Feb. , FO /.
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with by greater clarity in the language of the charter. Even so, Cripps
said ‘that in its present form it would be politically impossible to
present the charter to parliament’. If it were not possible to resolve the
outstanding issues quickly, he added, the conference should adjourn
for two or three months. Douglas advised the state department: ‘The
only other course which Cripps informs me his government can take is
to refuse to sign the charter,’ although this was something that the
British would do only with extreme reluctance.1
Wilcox, who perceived this to be a threat from Cripps, was in a
strong position to resist, owing to his success in working with the Euro-
pean – and indeed the British – delegations to bring together the out-
standing issues with the underdeveloped countries into a single
package. The British delegation’s support for Wilcox is evidence for its
difficulties in co-ordinating its work with the government. The under-
developed group was to be told to accept the concessions – mainly
relating to new preferences and QRs – in their entirety or not at all.
The United States had, with increasing success, used divide-and-rule
tactics against the developing countries, securing their opposition to
each other’s more extreme amendments. As Wilcox noted, ‘the irony
of this whole situation is that the undeveloped countries, which at first
were expected to have an articulate and effective bloc, have no effective
bloc because their interests are too divergent to keep them together
even on developmental matters.’2 Only later, in the s and s,
would Third World countries learn to co-ordinate more effectively.
Therefore, at this time, in contrast to later decades, they were bought
off relatively cheaply. In this way, the United States could isolate the
British at little expense, using the acquiescence of the underdeveloped
countries as a means to ‘target’ the state that was the real focus of its
interest.
Moreover, the fact that British officials in Havana had helped to put
together the package made it easier to call the cabinet’s bluff. For if the
British delegation now reversed its position on orders from Cripps, it
would hardly be able to sway other countries. Its standing at the con-
ference already showed signs of diminishing. On  February, Wilcox
advised Clayton:
If the conference is adjourned, Cripps threatens UK will not ‘sign the Charter’
… You will recall that Cripps threatened to walk out on the Geneva negoti-
ations last summer unless we would give British complete freedom to discrim-
inate for a year. We capitulated. Subsequently he refused flatly to carry out the
commitment of his government to negotiate in good faith for the elimination of
preferences. We capitulated again. Now he is employing the same tactics. But
the situation is radically different. Everything is out in the open. He cannot get
his way in secret. He is completely isolated – from the rest of the Common-
1 Douglas to Thorp,  Feb. , FRUS, , i. -, ; FO to UKDH,  Feb. , FO
/; FO to embassy, Washington,  March , FO /.
2 Minutes, mtg., USDH,  Feb. , USNA, RG , ITF, box .
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wealth, from the countries of Europe, from the undeveloped countries of the
world. We do not have to give him anything. The UK will not move to adjourn
the conference. It will sign the final act.1
So it proved. By  March, the British were willing to accept article 
(on QRs) as it stood. They were willing to accept article  (new pref-
erences) if an interpretative note were added, stating that the ITO
‘need not interpret the term “economic region” to require close geo-
graphical proximity if it is satisfied that a sufficient degree of economic
integration exists between the countries concerned’.2 This note, which
was added to the charter, would allow the Empire, or parts of it, to be
designated as belonging to the same economic region; but, as not even
the other Commonwealth countries were enthusiastic, it amounted to
little more than a political fig-leaf.
Non-discrimination remained the stumbling-block. The British
government was now worried, probably unnecessarily, that the most
recent US draft of article  would outlaw discriminatory bilateral
trade deals into which Britain had already entered.3 At the end of Feb-
ruary, L. P. Thompson-McCausland, a member of the British delega-
tion specializing on the issue, was recalled for consultation with
ministers.4 But, in spite of his previous assurance, Cripps now tried to
do more than merely seek greater clarity in the language of the charter.
On  March, at another meeting with Douglas, he handed over a new
aide-mémoire5 in which, overriding the board of trade’s officials, he
included a formula giving Britain greater freedom to discriminate than
the existing draft envisaged. The Truman administration, which
viewed the suggestion as an attempt to get round Britain’s bilateral ob-
ligations to the United States under the  loan agreement, rejected
it out of hand.6
Nevertheless, the Truman administration was not inflexible. It
offered a dual-option text, allowing GATT-signatory countries the
choice of whether to accept the criteria set by the IMF, or the criterion
included in the Geneva draft of the charter. By taking the Geneva
option, Britain, so long as it was in balance-of-payments difficulties,
would have a general but not unfettered right to discriminate, up until
. Thereafter, no new forms of discrimination could be introduced
without the prior approval of the ITO, but existing arrangements could
continue, subject to challenge by other countries. Wilson quickly
agreed. However, in a further example of poor co-ordination, the Brit-
ish delegation in Havana professed for several days that it knew
1 Wilcox to Clayton,  Feb. , FRUS, , i. .
2 Douglas to Marshall,  March , FRUS, , i. -.
3 Thompson-McCausland to Helmore,  March , FO /.
4 Wilcox to Clayton,  Feb. , FRUS, , i. .
5 For the text of the aide-mémoire, see FO to embassy, Washington,  March , FO /.
6 Douglas to Clayton,  March , and Clayton to Douglas,  March , FRUS, , i. -;
FO to UKDH,  March , FO /.
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nothing of the agreement, thus holding up the conference.1 Wilcox
claimed that the British, in accepting, had shot themselves in the foot.
He believed that the original US draft allowed a wider range of transi-
tional discrimination than the Geneva text, and that the decision to
take the Geneva option, although it made the board of trade happy,
‘gave HMG less than it had to start with’. The key difference between
the Havana and the Geneva options was that the former allowed
countries in balance-of-payments difficulties, throughout the remain-
der of the post-war transition period, to continue to operate those dis-
criminatory restrictions that had been in place on  March ;
whereas the latter allowed discrimination within defined functional
limits without setting a base date. The British preferred the Geneva
option because on  March  they had been bound by the non-
discrimination provisions of the  loan agreement and therefore,
under the Havana option, would have had less freedom to discriminate
than some other countries. Wilcox’s claim, which must have rested on
a belief that the Geneva option would not have allowed the continu-
ation of various restrictions which Britain had had in force in March
, remains moot, as there is room for doubt about how the article
would have been interpreted in practice had the ITO come into being.2
What is clear, however, is that the United States had not been forced
into making substantial concessions all round in order to win agree-
ment for the charter. Having secured general acceptance for select
concessions to the underdeveloped group, it made some tactical com-
promises in order to help to persuade Britain to swallow its doubts
about them. The value of what Britain had received was debatable,
and, undoubtedly, left it with little credibility in Havana.
British ministers were not under the illusion that the conference had
been a success. An attempt to transfer the discussion of non-discrim-
ination from Havana to Washington having been firmly rebuffed, the
question of whether or not to sign the final act of the conference was
judged sufficiently important to be brought before the cabinet on 
March.3 Wilson maintained his pragmatic line: ‘While the final draft
[charter] was in some respects less acceptable to us than the Geneva
draft, we should not be supported, even by Commonwealth delega-
tions, in pressing for the further changes which we should like to see
incorporated in it.’ Refusal to sign, he argued, would appear inconsist-
ent with previous actions and statements and would seriously endanger
the tariff concessions to which the United States administration had
agreed. Other (unidentified) ministers objected to the terms of the
1 Minutes, mtg., USDH,  March , USNA, RG , ITF, box .
2 Wilcox to Douglas,  March , FRUS, , i. ; Wilcox to Hawkins,  March , USNA,
RG , ITF, box ; Havana charter, article  and annex K; Brown, Restoration, pp. -, -
.
3 Memcon., Weiss,  March , FRUS, , i. -; FO to embassy, Washington,  March
, FO /.
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revised article relating to new preferences: ‘there was a risk of serious
discrimination against the British Commonwealth in this matter.’ The
cabinet agreed that the British delegation should continue to try to find
a more acceptable form of words; if this should not prove possible,
Holmes, in signing the final act, should state that Britain interpreted
the article, in conjunction with the explanatory note, to mean that the
ITO would treat proposals for new preferences within the Common-
wealth on the same basis as other proposals covered by the article.1
Unsurprisingly, it proved impossible to get any change in the wording
at this late stage. The following week, on  March, Britain joined with
fifty-two other countries in signing the final act of the conference.
Argentina and Poland did not sign, and Turkey postponed signing
until July .2
In the final round of conference speeches, Holmes struck a down-
beat note. He stated that neither in its general balance nor in its
detailed provisions was the charter wholly satisfactory to Britain, which
would look to the ITO to prevent any unfair treatment of the Com-
monwealth, and would need in the early years of the organization’s
existence to make full use of the latitude afforded by article  to
countries with balance-of-payments problems. While the government
did intend to recommend the charter to parliament in due course, its
ability to do so would depend on circumstances beyond its control.
Clayton, by contrast, was jubilant: ‘This may well prove to be the
greatest step in history toward order and justice in economic relations
among the members of the world community and toward a great
expansion in the production, distribution, and consumption of goods
in the world.’3
* * *
American jubilation and British despondency were not, of course,
proof in themselves of a substantive US triumph. The Truman admin-
istration had been defeated or outmanoeuvred on some issues. It had
failed to secure an amendment to the charter by which ITO members
would grant most-favoured-nation treatment to the exports of the
occupied areas: Germany and Japan. It was forced to abandon what
proved to be a short-lived conversion to the principle of weighted
voting (as opposed to one vote for each country) in the ITO. It had
been persuaded by US business interests to include in the charter pro-
visions on the security of foreign investment, but the provisions that
were actually negotiated proved, from the point of view of those
interests, unacceptably weak.4
1 Minutes, cabinet,  March , CAB /, CM () nd.
2 Brown, Restoration, p. .
3 ‘Trade Negotiations Committee: The Havana Trade Conference’, memo,  June  [London,
Public Record Office], B[oard of ] T[rade Records] / TN () ; ‘Statement by the Honourable
William L. Clayton at final plenary session, on  March ’, USNA, RG , ITF, box .
4 Zeiler, Free Trade, pp. -; Dennison to Carter,  Dec. , FRUS, , i. ; Aaronson,
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Moreover, other aspects of the charter were unpalatable to the Tru-
man administration, even if it had long since reconciled itself to them.
For example, from the US point of view, agreements for the stabiliza-
tion of commodity prices were fundamentally inconsistent with the
other provisions of the charter. Nonetheless, on the assumption that
primary producing countries would inevitably enter into them, it
accepted that it was desirable to lay down ‘rules of the road’ and thus
eliminate some of the worst characteristics of previous such agree-
ments.1 Other provisions left the balance of advantage open to debate.
For instance, article , paragraph (b) appeared to mean that no
country could be required to alter policies directed towards the main-
tenance of full employment or the promotion of economic develop-
ment, even if these created balance-of-payments difficulties. This
‘looked like the perfect loophole for the indefinite retention of controls’
such as QRs.2 Yet the IMF would have the responsibility for deter-
mining if a country was in such difficulties, and thus determining
whether or not such controls were permissible. And, because of the
IMF’s system of weighted voting, the United States would have the
biggest say.
In accepting the charter in its final form, had the United States
sacrificed its principles, as Dryden asserts?3 Is Zeiler right to claim that
‘the charter was so ridden with exceptions to free trade that much of its
original meaning had been eroded in a morass of discriminatory meas-
ures’; and even that ‘government regulation and protectionism served
as its foundation’? (One might note in passing that the GATT, which
Zeiler praises for being ‘flexible’, was also riddled with exceptions to
free-trade rules.)4 Or was it the case, as Diebold implies, that the less
welcome provisions, from the US point of view, were ‘dubious but
tolerable because they were necessary parts of an acceptable com-
promise’?5 To attempt to answer these questions is, of course, to revive
the contemporary controversy between the charter’s advocates and its
‘perfectionist’ opponents. Yet this is worthwhile, as it seems that
Dryden and Zeiler almost uncritically accept the arguments of the
‘perfectionists’.
The arguments advanced by the US delegation in defence of its own
work were mostly, if not totally, convincing. A document prepared just
before the end of the Havana conference noted that the United States
had held the line established at London and Geneva on twenty issues;
had obtained nine positively desirable changes to the charter; had de-
feated several attempts to distort the ITO’s purpose; had made four
            
Trade, pp. -; Diebold, End of the ITO, pp. -.
1 US SCFHITO () S-O-A,  March , p. .
2 Diebold, End of the ITO, p. .
3 Dryden, Trade Warriors, p. .
4 Zeiler, Free Trade, pp. -, .
5 Diebold, End of the ITO, p. .
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minor concessions (including designating it ‘the Havana charter’, a
move calculated to appeal to the Latin Americans); had made three
significant compromises (on QRs, new preferences, and in allowing
members to appeal to the ITO from decisions by the contracting
parties denying admission to the GATT); and had failed to achieve its
aim of requiring members to deny most-favoured-nation treatment to
non-members. This may not have been a definitive list of gains and
losses, but the final comments on the charter were compelling:
Broader scope and greater detail than any previous conference or agreement
on economic relations; substance of Charter, unlike UNESCO [UN Edu-
cational, Scientific and Cultural Organization], WHO [World Health Organ-
ization], etc., pertains to vital economic interests; functions of ITO, unlike
those of FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization, ILO [International Labour
Organization], etc., go beyond study and recommendation – commitments in
Charter limit freedom of action; commitments more numerous and more far-
reaching than in Bretton Woods Agreements – unaccompanied by any
provision of financial assistance.1
As Clayton noted, ‘viewed against the record of the inter-war years,
the accomplishment of the Havana Conference is truly remarkable.’2
Of course, the US negotiators’ opinions cannot be taken at face value,
but their positive assessment of the charter was shared by the Can-
adians, who together with the Benelux countries, were better disposed
towards free-trade purism than the Truman administration.3
Moreover, it might well be argued that, to the extent that the United
States made concessions, they were the almost inevitable result of the,
surely necessary, decision to involve other countries in the design of
the ITO system. It would have been difficult, if not impossible, for the
Truman administration to have obtained, from its own point of view, a
better result. As Wilcox noted, ‘we had come out with a Charter telling
us not to do things that we would in any event not do and, further-
more, we are permitted through various exceptions to do all of the
things which we wish or may have to do.’4 That, however, did not pre-
vent US opinion from taking offence, partly because the ITO lacked
powerful advocates in Washington: both Clayton and Wilcox retired
after the conference, the latter to write a book aimed at persuading
congress of the charter’s virtues. Dean Acheson, who became secretary
of state in , was prepared to send the charter for congressional
consideration, and to speak in favour of it, but lacked Clayton’s drive
and conviction on the subject.5 The outbreak of the Korean war in
1 Memo, ‘Outcome of United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment’,  March ,
USNA, RG , ITF, box .
2 Clayton to Marshall, n.d., FRUS, , i. .
3 Report of the Canadian delegation,  July , DCER, , xiv. .
4 ‘Memo. of Conversation: ITO Charter’,  March  [Independence, MO, Truman Library],
Clayton-Thorp office files, box .
5 Leddy, Oral History, p. .
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June , which meant that congressional time had to be devoted to
emergency business, sealed the ITO’s fate: in December, the adminis-
tration announced that it would not proceed with ratification.
* * *
The supposedly ‘interim’ GATT survived in the ITO’s place. Argu-
ably, this instrument served the United States (and other industrialized
powers) at least as well as, if not better than, the ITO would have
done. To what degree, then, would an ITO-based regime have been
more inclusive, orderly, just, and productive than the GATT-based
regime that emerged in its place? Certainly, the final stage of the nego-
tiations for the Havana charter included more developing countries
than the earlier talks that produced the GATT; and this very fact is, if
anything, more important than the cold war in explaining the con-
cessions made in these countries’ favour. Whether or not the ITO
would have gained a wider membership than the GATT, is, of course,
a question that cannot be definitively answered. As the example of the
United States demonstrates, signing the final act of the conference was
no guarantee that a country would ratify the charter. Therefore, it is
possible that ITO membership might not, at least at first, have reached
far beyond the thirty-four countries that by April  had been willing
to sign the GATT.1
Nevertheless, even without a wider membership than the GATT, it
is conceivable that the ITO would have been more orderly in its
methods for resolving trade disputes. The great strength of the GATT
as a negotiating forum was the potential for ongoing revision of its
rules, giving it a flexibility that the proposed ITO lacked. On the other
hand, the legal force of the GATT rules was doubtful. Moreover, legal
proceedings within GATT could be stymied by countries found to be
in contravention of the rules. Yet even had the ITO mechanism im-
proved the administration of formal justice, it is still likely that the
industrialized powers would have found ways to bend the rules to their
own advantage. As British foreign office officials noted during the
Havana talks: ‘The interpretation of many of the articles of the Charter
will inevitably depend on the economic strength of the parties debating
them. We can therefore hope, as we regain strength, to be able to get
an increasingly favourable interpretation of the development and non-
discrimination articles, provided that we remain on good terms with
the USA.’2
It is also possible that, even on the optimistic assumptions of wide
membership, substantively just rules, and reduced scope for gerry-
mandering by the great powers, the ITO would not have proved to be
a substantially more economically productive regime than the GATT.
1 Zeiler, Free Trade, p. .
2 ‘International Trade Organisation Charter: Minutes’,  Feb. , FO /.
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From , special treatment was granted to developing countries
under GATT rules, allowing them to protect particular industries and
to plead balance-of-payments reasons for adding to quantitative re-
strictions on trade. Yet few developing countries made wise use of
these provisions.1 Nevertheless, the fact that countries may not always
make best use of the freedom to do intelligent things is no reason for
not granting it. To this degree, the Havana charter was a forward-
looking document.
On balance, it is not clear that, on the basis of the criteria selected,
the ITO would have been a better option than the GATT. This is not,
however, for the reasons that contemporary US critics and later US
historians have advanced. It is not the case that the United States
made inordinate or unlimited concessions in Cuba. If anything – from
the point of view of establishing just rules, rather than that of reaching
a settlement that would be acceptable to congress – it did not make
enough. At the same time, it may be noted that the balance of those
concessions – made for the most part to the underdeveloped countries,
rather than to Britain and Europe – reflected the increasing political
significance of what would rather later become known as ‘the Third
World’. This term, in itself, was loaded with cold war significance, and
it would be wrong to deny that the perceived need to prove the non-
Communist world’s ability to reach agreement on economic issues
played a part in the US decision to press ahead with the ITO in -
. But it was not the whole story. The United States was still learning
to play at multilateralism. It did so successfully in terms of securing
international agreement, but only at the price of alienating its own
domestic opinion. Moreover, the issues of international economic
order, justice, inclusiveness, and productivity which were under dis-
cussion at Havana were much older concerns than the cold war, and
they will long outlive its end.
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